By Matthew Egger
On July 10, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) 56 times, tying with October 4, 2021, as a record high. ADIZ incursions have risen markedly since Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te took office on May 20. While August 2022 set the record for the highest number of ADIZ violations at 446, July 2024 was a close second with 423. The PLA violates Taiwan’s ADIZ to demonstrate the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) disapproval of President Lai, whom it regards as a separatist troublemaker. ADIZ violations tax Taiwan’s combat preparedness as its air force continually scrambles jets to intercept the intruding PLA aircraft. ADIZ violations also wear down the Taiwanese people’s resolve and threat awareness as they grow accustomed to China’s near-constant military presence in Taiwan’s ADIZ.
At the same time, the CCP is escalating maritime gray zone activity against Taiwan. In June, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) passed new regulations allowing it to detain foreign nationals for trespassing in PRC-claimed waters for up to 60 days. The CCG has already enforced the new regulations, notably detaining the Taiwanese fishing boat Da Jin Man No.88 and its crew 11.5 miles from Fujian Province in Chinese territorial waters on July 2. The PRC only released the Da Jin Man crew on August 13. The CCG is also harassing Taiwanese fishermen near Penghu and Kinmen, two outlying island groups Taiwan governs. On July 5, a Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) vessel discovered a CGA vessel 30 miles northwest of Penghu’s Mudou Island attempting to expel nearby Taiwanese fishing boats. The location at which the CCG vessel tried to remove the Taiwanese fishing boats was not within Chinese territorial waters nor its contiguous zone, but rather within Taiwan’s claimed exclusive economic zone, reflecting how China uses the CCG to exert maritime pressure on Taiwan. Similarly, the PRC has more frequently probed and violated Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters since February. On July 11, four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters in four locations, stretching the CGA’s capabilities thin. The July 11 incursions marked the 31st instance the CCG violated Kinmen’s restricted waters in 2024.
ADIZ incursions and maritime harassment, however, do not existentially threaten Taiwan. Until now, the Taiwanese people’s desire to maintain their quasi-independence from China and democratic way of life appears to outweigh their fear of growing Chinese intimidation or belief that unification is inevitable. An August 1 poll by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), for instance, revealed that a plurality (36.9%) of Taiwanese people prefer maintaining the cross-strait status quo indefinitely and another 20.8% support maintaining the status quo while moving toward independence. At the same time, a June 2024 National Chengchi University (NCCU) poll demonstrated that 64.3% of Taiwanese citizens identified as Taiwanese, while only 2.2% identified as Chinese. Together, the MAC and NCCU polls suggest that the Taiwanese people’s desire to continue to govern themselves and maintain their Taiwanese identity remains strong despite growing Chinese airspace and maritime intimidation and harassment.
Given the Taiwanese people appear undeterred by PLA airspace and maritime aggression, Taiwanese policymakers should not allocate undue focus and resources on countering PLA gray zone intimidation and harassment. Instead, policymakers should prioritize preparing to defend against a full-scale PLA invasion of the island, a contingency that would existentially threaten Taiwan. At first glance, countering the PLA in the gray zone and preparing to defend against a full-scale Chinese invasion may not appear to be mutually exclusive objectives. Both are military threats that require a military response. However, responding to ADIZ incursions and defending against a full-scale invasion of Taiwan require vastly different weapons systems.
To counter Chinese gray zone activity in the airspace, Taiwan’s Air Force often scrambles fighter jets to intercept PLA aircraft. These fighters are expensive to acquire, operate, and maintain. While fighters are useful in countering ADIZ incursions, the jets and their runways will become priority targets for the PLA in the early stages of a full-scale invasion. The PLA can use its large arsenal of precision missiles to render Taiwan’s entire fleet of fighter jets inoperable. Furthermore, for Taiwan, a small country with a small defense budget, fighter jets are not a cost-effective defense investment. In 2019, the US approved a US$8 billion arms package of 66 F-16C/D Block 70 aircraft to Taiwan, a substantial expenditure for a country with a defense budget of only US$11 billion that year. Purchasing F-16s and other expensive and flashy platforms that the PLA will likely destroy in the early stages of a war crowds out investment in weapons systems that can give Taiwan a fighting chance against China.
Similar to Taiwan’s Air Force, the CGA invests in high-tonnage, expensive vessels to counter China’s maritime gray zone activity. The CGA recently commissioned the last of four 4000-ton Chiayi class offshore patrol vessels that it uses to protect Taiwanese fishermen and conduct international humanitarian assistance and law enforcement activities. The four Chiayi-class vessels cost US$344 million, occupying over one-fourth of a US$1.35 billion 2018-2027 special budget for the funding of 141 coast guard vessels the government aims to commission by 2027. While these ships may be useful in countering and deterring CCG gray-zone activity in Taiwan’s surrounding waters, they are unlikely to survive the early stages of an all-out war with China as they are large, slow, and difficult to conceal, making them easy targets for the PLA. Furthermore, the high cost of large ships like the Chiayi class precludes Taiwan from procuring weapons systems that would be of greater use during an all-out war.
PLA airspace and maritime gray zone activity only become an existential threat to Taiwan if it intimidates the Taiwanese people to the extent that they prefer unification with China or view it as inevitable. This is not the case. Conversely, a PRC invasion is an existential threat that Taiwanese policymakers must prepare for now. Accordingly, Taiwan should prioritize acquiring cheap, small-scale, mobile, and concealable weapons systems that can survive and repel a full-scale invasion and decrease or even cease purchases of “prestige” systems like the F-16, high-tonnage vessels, and main battle tanks. Abandoning these prestige items will not be easy due to bureaucratic inertia, resistance to asymmetric defense among Taiwan’s defense establishment, and the psychological toll that allowing China to conduct gray zone activities freely will inflict on Taiwan’s people. Nonetheless, jettisoning these prestige weapons systems is the right thing to do for a country that cannot defend itself using a conventional strategy.
